So, in Piker, the issue was NOT whether preexisting regulations prohibited Pirker's operation of the device as he did, but WHETHER those preexisting regulations APPLIED at all to him since the FAA had not previously interpreted its regulatory authority/jurisdiction to include such devices within the definition of the term of art, "aircraft." Ultimately, under the terms of a settlement, the FAA amended its assessment to include ONLY facts constituting reckless operation and a determination of reckless operation of a regulated "aircraft," and Pirker WAIVED HIS RIGHTS TO AN APPEAL and agreed not to contest that determination so that it became final and non appealable (a so-called agreement not to contest the FAA's factual and legal determinations against him). The amount of the fine was immaterial to the FAA and to us since IT EXPRESSLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ESTABLISHED AS PRECEDENT BOTH ITS INTERPRETATION OF "AIRCRAFT" AS INCLUDING TRAPPY'S DEVICE, AND SIMILAR DEVICES, AND ITS (PER CHEVRON) INTERPRETATION OF ITS REGULATIORY AUTHORITY/JURISDICTION AS INCLUDING OR EMBRACING SUCH, OR SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY IN EXISTENCE OR YET TO COME INTO EXISTENCE.
The parties, the FAA and Pirker, during the ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS in the FAA and NTSB, each recognized that the FAA had not previously asserted regulatory authority, with the FAA saying it now interpreted its regulations as applicable (Chevron deference attached), and Trappy saying Congress never delegated this right, and the FAA's prior NON-ASSERTION of regulatory authority demonstrates this-the NTSB, sitting as an appellate body, though still in an agency proceeding in the executive branch, found the FAA, under the enabling act, had the right or power to regulate "aircraft" at all relevant times, and that the FAA, retrospectively or prospectively, owing to changing technology, could interpret its regulatory authority/power or substantive regulations to assure public safety regardless of whether the device existed in 1958, or at any time thereafter. Pirker chose not to appeal to the Judicial branch, and the FAA got what it wanted, BINDING PRECEDENT that it could regulate these devices and the entire field, and it proceeded to do so.
Applying traditional proximate cause analysis, the "conditions" or causes that existed before Pirker included, without limitation, a federal agency, with regulatory authority, that prohibited reckless operation of "aircraft." The final "cause" or proxmiate cause in our little story was Pirker's reckless operation (yes, that's what he agreed NOT to contest) of the device, which then "lighted up" or resulted, proximately, in the FAA's express assertion of regulatory authority/regulation over our little hobby, and Piker, being the ass and spoiler he is, ran off to Hong Kong and left a turd in the punchbowl for us.